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Who Holds Power in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa? 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The transition from apartheid to democracy in South Africa, marked above all 
by the election in 1994 of a government led by the African National Congress 
(ANC) and headed by President Nelson Mandela, represented a milestone not 
only for South Africa but for Africa generally.  The transition meant the end of 
formal colonial or settler rule in Africa.  On one level, the new South African 
democracy appears robust and substantive.  Whilst there has been no turnover in 
office at the national level, free and fair legislative elections have been held 
regularly, with a universal franchise and multi-party competition, and there is an 
independent judiciary, a critical press, and a vigorous civil society.  But there are 
at least two grounds for questioning the quality of the new democracy.  First, the 
strength of the ANC undermines the constitutional separation of powers and the 
real accountability of the executive to the electorate.  Secondly, the ANC is 
widely accused of having ‘betrayed’ the working-class and poor by adopting 
neo-liberal policies that serve the interests of capital and therefore represent a 
continuity from the apartheid era.  Whilst there is some merit in each critique, 
the formal procedures of representative democracy are not inconsequential, and 
(more importantly) a range of classes and interest-groups besides ‘capital’ wield 
power, albeit in different ways.  
 
 
The Route to Representative Democracy 
 
The struggle for a non-racial democracy in South Africa dates back to the very 
formation of the Union of South Africa – comprising two defeated Boer 
Republics and two British colonies – in 1910.  The former colony of the Cape 
had, and retained until the 1930s, a franchise defined primarily by property, with 
a significant minority of African and coloured voters.  The Cape franchise was 
not, however, extended to the other provinces of the new Union.  Indeed, racial 
discrimination and exclusion intensified in the 1930s and then again after the 
election of the National Party and the enactment of apartheid after 1948.  
Demands for an end to racial discrimination and exclusion were raised through 
legal and institutional processes through the first half of the century, before the 
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turn to direct action in the 1950s and armed struggle in the 1960s.  By the end of 
the 1960s, with the ANC and other ‘liberation movements’ defeated, internal 
dissent quelled, and the economy growing rapidly, it appeared that white 
minority rule was secure. 
 
The very economic growth and change that seemed to sustain apartheid also 
served to undermine it.  The demand for semi-skilled and skilled labour drove 
the rapid expansion of public education, albeit of racially unequal quality.  
Despite restrictions on urbanization, the settled urban African population grew 
steadily.  The result was, by the 1980s, an organized African working class and 
an aspirant African middle class, both of which resented the remaining and 
severe restrictions on their standard of living and opportunities for upward 
mobility as well as the denial of political rights.  At the same time, rapidly 
growing numbers of unemployed and landless poor provided a ready 
constituency for direct action.  Militant trade unions combined with resistance in 
the townships (and some rural areas) to push the apartheid state to limited 
concessions and, later, negotiations.  The ANC was unbanned and Nelson 
Mandela released in early 1990.  Formal negotiations led to agreement over an 
interim constitution and transitional power-sharing, and then the elections of 
1994. 
 
 
The Institutional Architecture of South African 
Democracy 
 
The legislature elected in 1994 also served as a constitutional assembly to 
complete the process of drafting a new constitution.  The result, in 1996, was a 
liberal democratic constitution that rejected consociational power-sharing but set 
real constraints on executive power.  In contrast to the apartheid era, it is the 
constitution, not parliament, that is sovereign.  The constitution provides for a 
separation of powers between the branches of government: the executive, 
legislature, judiciary, and a set of independent statutory bodies (established 
under Chapter 9 of the Constitution) such as the Auditor-General and the 
Electoral Commission.  (The Reserve Bank is independent, but by Act of 
Parliament, not under the Constitution).  The constitution also provides for a 
separation of powers between different tiers of government, i.e. national, 
provincial and local government.  The third constraint on executive power stems 
from the inclusion of a Bill of Rights that stipulates not only civil and political 
freedoms but also socio-economic rights.   
 
But many of the checks and balances have proved ineffective in the face of a 
generally centralised governing party with overwhelming electoral support.  The 
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constitution provides for a parliamentary system, with a parliament that is 
elected by the citizenry (the National Assembly by direct election, the National 
Council of Provinces by the provincial legislatures) and a president who is 
elected by and is accountable to parliament.  Local, provincial and national 
legislatures are elected separately, and each tier of government enjoys 
considerable autonomy from the others.  There is even an independent Fiscal 
and Financial Commission to guide the division of government revenues 
‘vertically’, between the different tiers, and ‘horizontally’, between the different 
provinces (and municipalities).  But, in practice, the system is more like a hybrid 
presidential-parliamentary system, and more unitary than federal.  The national 
executive has come to predominate, and the national legislature and sub-national 
tiers of government have been reduced to minor roles. 
  
The legislature has proved to be the weakest institution of state.  It has done 
little more than pass legislation prepared by the executive and has rarely even 
tried to hold the executive to account.  With very occasional exceptions, 
primarily during 1996-97, parliamentary portfolio committees play only passive 
roles.  This is largely due to the heavy hand of the ANC, which ‘redeployed’ 
Members of Parliament (MPs) and was quick to suppress independent action.  
For example, when the finance committee dared to examine the government’s 
policy of inflation-targeting in 2000, the entire ANC membership of the 
committee was summonsed to a personal dressing-down by the president.  And 
when the Standing Committee on Public Accounts began to flex its muscles, the 
chairman (from the Inkatha Freedom Party) was ousted and the senior ANC 
member sidelined, ensuring that the committee resumed a quiescent role.  
Parliament has not been diligent in overseeing executive action.  Nor has it been 
diligent in punishing misconduct among its own members, most notably in the 
‘travelgate’ scandal when members of parliament, almost all from the governing 
party (and probably including very senior members), defrauded parliament with 
bogus travel claims (Murray and Nijzink 2002; Nijzink and Piombo 2005; 
February 2006; Calland 2006: ch. 4). 
 
Provincial governments have also failure to use the power accorded to them by 
the constitution. Whilst the national government and party leaderships might not 
be able to impose their will on the provinces in all respects, there is no doubt as 
to where real power lies in terms of policy-making and the allocation of 
resources. 
  
‘All around the world, critics lament the extent of executive dominance and the 
tyranny of party discipline in parliament’, note Murray and Nijzink (2002: 133); 
‘complaints about the lack of a truly deliberative style of decision-making and 
weak links between members and the people are equally common.’  But there 
are specific features of the South African political landscape that accentuate 
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these problems.  The passivity of the South African parliament is due in large 
part to the combination of the electoral system and the dominance of one party.  
A system of closed-list proportional representation, with provincial and national 
lists, serves to concentrate considerable power in the party leaders who control 
or influence whether someone’s name appears high or low on the list.  This is 
true of all parties.  But for MPs from the governing ANC, it means that they are 
deferential to the executive.  In 2003, the majority on a multi-party ‘Electoral 
Task Team’ recommended the division of the existing nine provincial 
constituencies into sixty-nine smaller, but still multi-member, constituencies.  
Three-quarters of the MPs would be elected in these constituencies, and the 
remaining one quarter proportionally to the parties’ total national votes.  The 
governing party rejected the majority recommendation, preferring instead the 
minority recommendation to retain the status quo (Nijzink and Piombo 2005).  
At the same time, the fact that the governing party has controlled almost all 
provinces – and, after 2004, all provinces – as well as the national government 
allows party discipline to trump the supposed national-provincial separation of 
powers also. 
 
Given the passivity of legislature and provincial governments, and the inclusion 
of rights in the constitution, it is unsurprising that the constitutional court has 
become a prospective player in policy-making.  Not all cases coming before the 
Constitutional Court entail challenges to executive power.  The legislature and 
executive happily hand over to the courts issues such as the abolition of capital 
punishment and the legalization of abortion, because it is decidedly convenient 
for the courts to take responsibility for unpopular ‘policies’.  Other cases have 
been more inconvenient to the government.  The most notable was the case 
brought by the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), demanding that the 
Department of Health treat pregnant women who are HIV-positive so as to 
reduce the likelihood of the transmission of HIV from mother to child.  In 
general, however, the Constitutional Court has been reluctant to trespass on the 
policy-making roles of the legislature and executive.  In two other cases dealing 
with socio-economic rights, the court required little of the executive.  In 
Soobramooney, the court decided that government was not obliged to provide 
kidney dialysis, which is very expensive, to a patient with multiple medical 
problems.  In Grootboom, the court decided that government was not obliged to 
provide housing for some homeless people, but it was obliged to have a plan 
under which it would realize progressively the right to shelter.   When a non-
government organization challenged in court the political parties’ refusal to 
disclose the sources of their funds, the High Court decided that it was the role of 
the legislature, not the courts, to make policy on such matters. 
 
The Constitutional Court is itself far from monolithic.  There have been 
important split decisions.  Such splits seem to be based in differing 
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commitments to an executive-led model of social and economic transformation.  
In perhaps the most important of these cases, the New Clicks case concerning 
state regulation of pharmaceutical prices, the Constitutional Court decided by 
the narrowest possible majority to overturn the regulations.  The dissenting 
minority were, in contrast, deferential to the executive.  The Court’s vote had 
racial overtones, given that all but one of the majority were white, and all of the 
minority were black (Dyzenhaus 2006). 
 
What the Court has achieved is the partial establishment of a culture of 
justification.  The court may be reluctant to engage in policy-making, but it has 
required repeatedly that the executive justify its actions, demonstrate their 
reasonableness, and show that its policies entail progress in the progressive 
realization of socio-economic rights.  This has partially filled the void left by 
parliament’s passivity.  But the courts have not stopped the government 
dragging its heels on the provision of treatment to the AIDS-sick, with the result 
that the death-toll of a largely treatable disease has moved toward one million.  
 
At the same time as power has become concentrated in the executive branch of 
government, there has been a centralization of power within the executive itself.  
The executive comprises the range of departments shaped by the Westminster 
model: a powerful National Treasury (which includes the former Department of 
Finance), a set of spending departments (especially Education, Health, Social 
Development – which is responsible for welfare programmes – and Housing), 
and the departments concerned with criminal justice, Foreign Affairs, Labour, 
and so on.  In 1994, a separate Ministry of Reconstruction and Development was 
established, with powers to top-slice the budgets of other departments and 
allocate these funds to promote development.  In the face of considerable and 
unsurprising opposition from the spending departments, the ministry was 
abolished in 1996 (Blumenfeld 1997; Nattrass and Seekings 1998).  The 
National Treasury is a ‘sort of government within a government’, with the 
Minister of Finance (Trevor Manuel) enjoying an ‘almost first-among-equals 
status in the cabinet’ (Calland 2006: 2).  The National Treasury’s power derives 
from both its control of multi-year financial planning and Trevor Manuel’s 
personal authority within the ANC.   
 
The greatest concentration of power, however, is in the Presidency itself, after 
Thabo Mbeki succeeded Nelson Mandela as President in 1999 (Clothia and 
Jacobs 2002).  With ever-growing budget and staff, the Policy Co-ordination 
and Advisory Services within the Presidency promotes ‘better co-ordination and 
implementation’ of policy.  It comprises five units, each working with one of the 
five ‘clusters’ of ministers in the cabinet, concerned with economics, social 
services, criminal justice, international relations and intergovernmental relations 
respectively.  There are also five presidential ‘working groups’ (for big business, 
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black business, agriculture, education, and religion) and two international 
advisory groups providing for regular communication between presidential 
officials and players outside of the state.  The President also appoints Director-
Generals in all government departments.  The power of the presidency means 
that key advisors or officials within it – especially Mbeki’s legal advisor, 
Mojanku Gumbi, and the head of the PCAS, Joel Netshitenzhe – wield 
considerable influence (Calland 2006: ch.1). 
 
Technocratic officials clearly wield considerable power in many government 
departments.  Critics of the government’s macro-economic policy often point to 
shadowy officials in the National Treasury, who ‘wrote’ the GEAR macro-
economic strategy in 1996.  But technocrats wield power only insofar as 
Ministers and the President allow them to do so.  Several Director-Generals 
have resigned, retired or been fired after serious disagreements with their 
Ministers.  In some cases, for example the Department of Land Affairs, whole 
cohorts of officials have been ousted when a new minister decides to change the 
direction of policy.  In Health, reformist officials are unable to effect a 
progressive AIDS policy in the face of a reactionary minister.  If technocrats 
within the National Treasury have power, it is because the Minister of Finance 
(and, ultimately, the President) chooses to give it to them. 
 
The reasons for the centralization of power within the executive, and within the 
Presidency more specifically, remain unclear.  The fact that this has gone along 
with a centralization of power within the ANC and an intolerance by President 
Mbeki of opposition inside or outside the party, suggests that the president’s 
personality is part of the story.  Calland (2006: 41) describes Mbeki as ‘a man 
with a devotion to long-term strategy and an egocentric view of his own epic 
place in history’, and who ‘knows his own mind, stubbornly so at times (as on 
HIV/AIDS)’.  But Mbeki’s passion for centralized power is rooted in a lifetime 
spent in exile in an ANC that was wedded to a vanguardist role.  A vanguardist 
conception of armed struggle easily led into a vanguardist conception of 
political (and economic) management. 
 
 
Elections, Voters and Parties 
 
Since 1994, the South African government has been formed by the ANC (albeit 
in the form of a ‘government of national unity’ in which the ANC has chosen to 
give a handful of cabinet or deputy-ministerial posts to other parties).  The ANC 
has secured about two-thirds of the total vote in each election, although the 
relative strength of opposition parties has shifted considerably.  The ANC also 
won control of seven of the nine provinces in the 1994 elections, gained partial 
control of an eighth in the 1999 elections, and won control of the ninth in 2002 
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when it lured legislators from other parties to defect to the ANC.  The ANC 
retained control of all nine provinces after the 2004 elections.  Overall, South 
Africa is a ‘dominant-party democracy’, in which the governing party is largely 
immune from effective challenge, there is little or no uncertainty about election 
results, and the electoral system provides for only weak accountability. 
 
In the founding elections, in late April 1994, the ANC won 63 percent of the 
votes.  It increased its share to 66 percent in the second general election in 1999, 
and to almost 70 percent in the third general election in 2004.  But it won fewer 
votes in both 1999 and 2004 than it had in 1994.  Despite the fact that the voting 
age population had risen by about one-fifth between 1994 and 2004, the total 
number of votes cast for all parties declined by about one-fifth over the same 
decade.  Elections have been conducted professionally and with little sign of 
intimidation.  Declining turnout is rather due to rising apathy.  Despite extra 
activities to boost voter registration, only 75 percent of the voting age 
population were registered for the 2004 elections.  Only 75 percent of the 
registered voters cast their votes.  This meant that only 58 percent of the voting 
age population actually voted.  This was way down from the 86 percent 
estimated for the 1994 elections, but in line with the turnout in other dominant-
party democracies (Piombo 2005). 
 
Part of the decline in voting is due to declining satisfaction with the performance 
of government.  Thabo Mbeki (president since 1999) has lower performance 
ratings than his predecessor, Nelson Mandela (president from 1994 to 1999), 
although Mbeki’s ratings edged up somewhat during the 2004 general election 
campaign.  The proportion of survey respondents that approves of the 
performance of the national government dipped below 50 percent in 2000-01, 
but rose somewhat thereafter (Mattes 2005; Hartzenberg 2006).  The ANC 
government is probably unique in the world that a majority of the ANC’s own 
declared supporters assess that the government’s performance on the most 
important problem facing the country – unemployment and job creation – has 
been poor.   
 
Alongside the decline in voting has been a decline in partisan identification, i.e. 
voters who have a deep-rooted psychological attachment to one or other party.  
In 1994, in the midst of liberation, levels of partisan identification were very 
high, but they declined rapidly thereafter.  By late 1995, fewer than six out of 
ten adults said that they identified with or felt ‘especially close’ to one or other 
party, and this proportion has changed little since then (Mattes 2005; 
Hartzenberg 2006).  It is certainly possible that the exceptionally high levels of 
partisan identification found in 1993-94, almost all with the ANC, reflected a 
short-lived rush of enthusiasm and endorsement rather than a deep-rooted 
loyalty (Seekings 1997).   
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Of course, the electorate in 2004 did not comprise the same individuals as the 
electorate ten years earlier.  One in three potential voters in 2004 had been too 
young to vote in 1994.  The emergence of a post-apartheid generation of voters 
will surely bring some changes in attitudes, but it cannot explain sharp drops in 
measured identification (such as that between 1994 and 1995).  Migration also 
reshapes the electorate at the provincial and local levels.  This is especially 
important in the Western Cape, where immigration from the ANC-supporting 
Eastern Cape has swollen the numbers of ANC supporters even faster than the 
immigration of white middle-class voters from other parts of the country has 
swollen the numbers of supporters for the rival Democratic Alliance.  The 
ANC’s rising share of the vote in the Western Cape (until 2004) seems to have 
been due more to the changing demographics than to any success by the ANC in 
converting voters from other parties (Seekings 2006). 
 
The results of the 1994 elections were generally interpreted in racial terms.  In 
its extreme form, elections were dismissed as racial censuses.  Some (white) 
scholars, shocked at the high votes for the ANC, concluded that African voters 
were not capable of reasoned voting, but were simply voting on the basis of 
racialised identities and loyalties (see, for example, many chapters in Johnson 
and Schlemmer 1996).  Whilst it was not difficult to rebut extreme forms of this 
argument (Mattes 1995; Seekings 1997), and Mattes et al. (1999) demonstrated 
that almost all voting behaviour could be explained in terms of partisan 
identification and issue-voting without any reference to race, it is clear that 
racialised identities and cultures do play some part in voting behaviour.  Among 
African voters, discontent with the performance of the ANC government does 
not lead to support for opposition parties.  Among white voters, even positive 
assessments of ANC government will rarely convert into actual votes for the 
ANC (Friedman 2005).  Race is an especially important prism through which 
some issues and interests are perceived and understood in the multi-cultural 
Western Cape (Eldridge and Seekings 1996; Seekings 2006). 
 
Identities are not immutable.  Whilst race remains important in many aspects of 
life (Seekings 2007), consciousness of class has grown in importance.  Asked in 
2003 to identify the biggest division in contemporary South Africa, one in five 
survey respondents pointed to racial divisions, and a similar proportion said 
divisions between political parties – but almost one in three pointed to the 
division between rich and poor.  If there is a shift in popular attitudes, it surely 
reflects in part the readily visible reality of a large, African elite and middle 
class, and hence of deep inequalities within the African population.  It is no 
longer true that all rich people are white or that all African people are 
disadvantaged (Seekings and Nattrass 2005). 
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The continuing dominance of the ANC does not mean that there have been no 
changes in the party political landscape.  On the contrary, there has been 
dramatic change among the opposition political parties, as the National Party 
(NP) – i.e. the party of apartheid – collapsed and died.  In the early 1990s, NP 
leaders fondly entertained the hope of being able to achieve a majority in a 
democratic election, through a combination of its own strong support and 
alliances with conservative parties with support in African areas (such as the 
Zulu-nationalist Inkatha Freedom Party, based in KwaZulu-Natal).  The NP won 
only 20 percent of the vote, and became the very junior partner to the ANC in 
the Government of National Unity.  In 1996, worried that its participation in 
government was costing it support, the NP went into opposition.  Its support 
continued to decline, however, and in 1999, the NP – born again as the New 
National Party (NNP) – was trounced by the resurgent, ‘liberal’ Democratic 
Party (DP).  Desperate, the NNP first joined with the DP as the Democratic 
Alliance (DA), then in 2001 one part of the NNP split away and entered into an 
alternative coalition with the ANC.  In 2004, the NNP won less than 2 percent of 
the vote (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2005).  Finally, in 2005, the NNP resolved to 
disband, with most of its remaining leaders being absorbed into the ANC. 
 
The collapse of the NNP was mirrored by the rise of the DP/DA.  From less than 
2 percent of the vote in 1994, the DP won almost 10 percent in 1999 and the DA 
won more than 12 percent in 2004.  In 2004, the newly-formed Independent 
Democrats (ID) won some support among coloured, former NNP supporters in 
Cape Town and elsewhere.  However dramatic, the rise of the DP/DA and ID 
reflected shifts between opposition parties, not success in eroding the ANC’s 
support.  Although the DA espouses a combination of free market economics 
and pro-poor social policies, it has failed to attract either rich or poor African 
supporters, and remains the party of South Africa’s racial minorities, i.e. white 
(English- and Afrikaans-speaking), coloured and Indian voters.  It also retains 
the public support of ‘white’ capital, although it seems that many prudent 
‘white’ companies also contribute financially to the ANC.  
 
The demise of the NNP was hastened by ‘floor-crossing’.  In order to absorb 
part of the rump of the NNP, the ANC introduced legislation allowing for MPs 
to ‘cross the floor’ and join other parties during specified and infrequent 
windows.  In early 2003, floor-crossing gave the ANC the two-thirds majority in 
Parliament that the electorate had twice denied it.  Floor-crossing also brought 
the ANC shared power in the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, i.e. the only 
two provinces hitherto run by opposition parties (Nijzink and Piombo 2005: 79-
82). 
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The Political Economy of Neo-liberalism 
 
A narrow analysis of the new institutions of democracy suggests that power lies 
with the ANC leadership.  The predominant interpretation of the political 
economy of South Africa, however, views the ANC leadership as the mere 
handmaidens of international and (to a lesser extent) domestic capital.  In this 
view, key ANC leaders in the Mandela government – including, especially, 
Thabo Mbeki (deputy president), Trevor Manuel (Minister of Trade and 
Industry from 1994 to 1995, and then Minister of Finance) and Alec Erwin 
(Manuel’s successor at Trade and Industry) – used their powerful positions to 
ram through business-friendly policies, shifting the ANC from a pro-poor to a 
pro-business, ‘neo-liberal’ position, symbolized by the adoption of the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macro-economic strategy in 1996. 
 
This interpretation rests on the disappointment that some on the political left felt 
when capitalism survived the end of apartheid.  For Patrick Bond, the challenge 
was to understand how a ‘popular-nationalist anti-apartheid project’ had given 
way to ‘official neoliberalism, by which is meant adherence to free market 
economic principles, bolstered by the narrowest practical definition of 
democracy’ (2000: 1).  Hein Marais (1998) emphasized the ‘limits to change’, to 
quote the subtitle of his book.  John Saul writes that ‘South Africa’s dramatic 
transition to a democratic dispensation (“one person, one vote in a united South 
Africa”) has been twinned with a simultaneous transition towards an ever more 
sweeping neo-liberal socio-economic dispensation that has negated in practice a 
great deal of the country’s democratic advance’ (2002: 28).  ‘Apartheid did not 
die’ declares the ubiquitous journalist John Pilger, in the title of a chapter on 
South Africa in his book Freedom Next Time (Pilger 2006). 
 
Foreign and domestic business elites certainly wield influence, mostly behind 
closed doors or on the golf course, away from prying eyes.  In office, as both 
deputy-president and president, Mbeki allegedly gave ‘business leaders 
unprecedented scope to shape government policies’ and draws ‘heavily on 
business advice’.  Mbeki ‘has gathered around him a select group of prominent 
people, mostly business leaders, divided into five working groups and three 
councils which he consults on key economic and social issues’  The 
international investment council includes, inter alia, the chief executive officers 
of Unilever, Ashanti Goldfields, Petronas and DaimlerChrysler, as well as the 
international financier George Soros  (Gumede 2002: 201-3).  Senior ministers 
meet regularly with senior South African and foreign businessmen, as of course 
is the case in any capitalist economy.   
 
But there is a big gap between acknowledging that Mbeki and senior ministers 
consult with businessmen and claiming that businessmen determine policy-
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making.  Businessmen, as well as international agencies such as the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund, exerted some influence in the early and mid-
1990s, shaping a concern over economic stability within the ANC.  A series of 
‘scenario-planning’ exercises in the early 1990s alerted the ANC leadership to 
the perils of economic crisis (Bond 2000: ch. 2).  But the fears that led to the 
adoption of GEAR in 1996 were not unreasonable.  President Mandela, when 
forming his government in 1994, had retained as finance minister the incumbent, 
who was a former businessman.  When the finance minister resigned later in 
1994, Mandela appointed a banker as his successor.  These choices reflected the 
ANC’s anxiety about jitters among both local and international businessmen.  
Only in 1996 did Mandela feel confident enough to appoint a black ANC 
member, Trevor Manuel, as minister of finance.  As Hirsch – a former academic 
economist who ended up working in the presidency under Mbeki – explains, the 
economy was not only already shrinking (at least in terms of per capita 
incomes), but it could all too easily shrink yet further.  GEAR was ‘the result of 
a number of vectors: unfounded rumours about President Mandela’s health; 
unfounded concerns about the appointment of the first ANC Finance Minister; 
noisy criticisms of the ANC’s economic policies by labour and big business; 
international uncertainties leading to a teetering rand; the high interest rate 
policy of the South African Reserve Bank; and what the government belatedly 
realized was an excessively generous public sector wage settlement’.  Above all, 
the combination of fiscal crisis and a weakening currency required decisive 
signals about the government’s fiscal conservatism and other policies.  The 
ANC, confident that the ‘liberation political dividend’ would ensure continuing 
electoral success, felt no need to introduce populist but short-sighted economic 
policies, and could instead look to growth in the medium-term  (Hirsch 2005: 4-
6, 66-9). 
 
By the late 1990s, the ANC appeared not so much pro-business as pro-black 
business.  ANC political and black business elites are intertwined in the ‘new 
establishment’ (Calland 2006: 265). Under Mbeki, the ANC government has 
promoted energetically ‘black economic empowerment’ (BEE).  The origins of 
BEE can be traced back to a meeting in 1993 at Mopane Lodge, in the Kruger 
National Park, where ANC and black business leaders agreed to work together.  
More importantly, a Black Economic Empowerment Commission was appointed 
in 1999, headed by ANC heavyweight Cyril Ramaphosa.  In a series of 
speeches, Mbeki defended the government’s investment in building a black 
business elite on the basis that it was part of its commitment to deracialisation.  
The first major legislation affecting BEE was the 2000 Preferential Procurement 
Framework Act, which required that government favours tenders from black-
owned companies.  The 2001 report of the BEE Commission led to further BEE 
legislation in 2003 and an explicit government strategy.  Central to the new 
strategy was the requirement that existing companies in each sector of the 
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economy commit themselves to ‘charters’ specifying targets in terms of BEE 
deals.  A BEE Council would be established, in the President’s office, to 
monitor compliance (Gumede 2002; Hirsch 2005; Gqubule 2006). 
 
‘The ANC has firmly established itself as the party of black business, the black 
middle class and professionals’, writes Gumede (2002: 252).  The ANC ‘will 
instinctively place the needs of these groups before those of the slum dwellers, 
unemployed, rural constituents and the youth’.  Many members of the new 
super-rich black elite are ANC insiders.  Tokyo Sexwale was premier of 
Gauteng Province; Cyril Ramaphosa was Mbeki’s main rival to succeed 
Mandela; Patrice Motsepe has never been active in the ANC, but he is linked by 
marriage to ANC leaders; Mathews Phosa was premier of Mpumalanga 
Province; Popo Molefe was premier of North-West Province; Saki Macozoma 
was a prominent ANC spokesperson; Moss Ngoasheng was Mbeki’s economic 
adviser; Wendy Luhabe is the wife of the current ANC premier of Gauteng; and 
so on.  Past and present ANC leaders have business interests; senior state 
officials know that they can build business careers quickly on leaving state 
employment; and ANC leaders and state officials live in the same social world 
as the new black economic elite.  The result is an unabashed ideology that what 
is the promotion of a black business elite is just (on the grounds of deracialising 
opportunities) and what is good for black business is good for South Africa (on 
a range of grounds, including the social democratic argument that wealth 
creation provides the resources that can be redistributed to the poor through the 
government’s social expenditure).   
 
The ANC’s own ally, the South African Communist Party (SACP), provides a 
more political interpretation of the political elite’s sponsorship of black 
business.  In a May 2006 discussion document, the SACP identified the 
construction of an ‘alliance between emerging black capital and … state-related 
technical/managerial strata’ as ‘a key part of the 1996 GEAR offensive … 
against the left’.  Because of the highly-developed character of South African 
capitalism, ‘emerging black capital … is excessively compradorist and 
parasitic’, dependent on state power to compel ‘established capital to cut this 
emerging faction a slice of the action in order to remain in favour’ with the new 
political elite.  But the relationship between black capital and the ANC 
leadership is symbiotic: the latter need the former against more progressive 
opponents (SACP 2006).  It certainly suits the ANC leadership to be able to play 
off their allies in the trade unions and SACP against their (black) allies in 
business, weakening both and thereby strengthening the ANC political elite 
itself.  Whether or not this was the intention, it is certainly the outcome. 
 
 
  
 
13
Working-class Power and the Limits of ‘Neo-
liberalism’ 
 
The power of business notwithstanding, arguments about the triumph of neo-
liberalism in South Africa misunderstand the nature – and thus seriously 
underestimate the importance – of working-class power.  The power of the 
organized labour movement is the primary reason why large parts of the GEAR 
strategy were never implemented.  GEAR comprised four major components: 
fiscal conservatism, trade liberalization, flexible labour market policies, and 
privatization (of state assets).  The budget deficit was controlled and trade was 
liberalized (or, more precisely, was further liberalized, given that most 
liberalization preceded 1996).  But labour market policies were not reformed, 
and the promised programme of privatization barely started.  These proposed 
policy reforms were vehemently opposed by the trade unions.  The much-
vaunted failure of GEAR to achieve its targets in terms of rising investment, job 
creation and so on, might be attributed to the failure to implement key parts of 
the strategy as much as to the parts that were in fact implemented. 
 
Gold-mining is one the sectors of the economy to experience massive job losses 
since the early 1990s.  Declining employment is routinely attributed by unions 
to GEAR.  But, as Tshitereke (2006) shows, the decline in mining employment 
has been part of a series of structural changes which predated or were 
independent of GEAR.  These included technological change, the changing price 
of gold, the growing difficulties of mining gold, and the rising cost of labour 
(especially unskilled labour) due to union militancy and pro-union labour policy.  
GEAR served, in part, as a convenient scapegoat for these other factors.  
Tshitereke suggests further that the real threat that GEAR posed to the 
mineworkers’ union was the prospect of outsourcing that would undermine the 
union’s organisational basis.  The implication is that the macro-economic 
aspects of GEAR were symbolic, whilst the promised labour market policy 
reforms were of direct and immediate concern to the union as an organisation. 
 
South Africa has a very strong trade union movement, built on the basis of 
delivering improved wages and employment conditions to workers.  In 2000, the 
460 registered trade unions had a total membership of about 3.5 million.  Just 
over one half of these member belong to one or other of the nineteen unions 
affiliated with the largest and most important trade union federation, the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).  COSATU’s affiliates 
have over 1,800 full-time officials, and the federation has a dedicated 
parliamentary office and research wing (Webster and Buhlungu 2004).  Only 38 
percent of trade union members are un- or semi-skilled workers, in sharp 
contrast to the position in the 1970s when the independent trade union 
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movement emerged.  The median wage of a unionized worker is more than 
double the median of non-unionized workers.  One in three COSATU members 
is in the public sector: its largest affiliate is still the National Union of 
Mineworkers, but the next four biggest affiliated unions are all in the public 
sector.  Almost no union member is in the poorest half of the South African 
population, which comprises instead households with workers in non-unionised 
sectors (such as domestic work and agriculture) and marginal forms of 
employment, or who are unemployed (South Africa’s unemployment rate 
standing at about 30 percent or about 40 percent, depending on how it is 
measured).  In the South African context, trade unions are a powerful movement 
of the non-poor. 
 
The power of the trade unions lies not in their use of industrial protest, but rather 
in the threat of such action, their entrenched position in union-friendly labour 
institutions, and, especially, their influence within the ANC.  There has been 
little strike action in post-apartheid South Africa, because there has been little 
need for it.  The high-point of union power was in the mid-1990s, when 
COSATU secured desired reforms of labour legislation.  Institutions and 
policies designed in the 1920s to protest the interests of skilled, white workers 
were extended and strengthened in the 1990s to protect the interests of the 
skilled, black workers that (then) comprised the backbone of COSATU.  The 
1995 Labour Relations Act provided for centralised bargaining between 
employers and unions within sectoral ‘bargaining councils’, procedures for the 
arbitration and settlement of disputes, and strong restrictions on dismissal by 
employers.  Wages negotiated in bargaining councils can be extended across 
entire sectors, including to non-participants in the negotiations, by ministerial 
fiat.  The 1997 Basic Conditions of Employment Act provided, inter alia, for 
statutory minimum wages in sectors where workers are not organized, helping 
further to contain any downward pressure on union members’ wages given the 
scale of unemployment.  At much the same time, unions secured favourable 
industrial policies that emphasized skills, rising productivity and hence rising 
wages (Nattrass 2001), and public sector workers secured large pay increases 
(which contributed to the fiscal crisis and GEAR).  Unions were central players 
in the corporatist National Economic, Development and Labour Council 
(NEDLAC).  The unions were also able to veto most of the privatization agenda 
associated with GEAR.   
 
Employers probably felt too weak to bargain more forcefully.  Big business was, 
in any case, not altogether unhappy with high wages as long as they were 
accompanied by high productivity and low levels of strike action.  Employers 
responded to this high-wage environment by shedding unskilled labour, and 
investing in more capital- and skill-intensive technologies.  Employers are 
unhappy with provisions for dismissing workers: By one estimate, it costs 
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business 1 percent of GDP to dismiss workers each year, and three times the 
number of work-days are lost through dismissal procedures than through work 
stoppages.  Some of the labour lawyers responsible for drafting the relevant 
labour legislation have spoken out against the gap between what they intended 
and what has ensued.1  Many employers adjust to such costs by reducing still 
further employment, especially of unskilled workers.  The consequence of these 
policies was that average real wages rose, in part because the demand for 
unskilled labour declined, whilst the profit share rose.  The post-apartheid 
growth path was good for employers and for those workers who kept their jobs.  
The losers were workers who lost their jobs and did not find new employment, 
and the chronically unemployed (Seekings and Nattrass 2005: ch.10).   
 
GEAR had envisaged reforms to labour market policies to render them more 
flexible and employer-friendly.  In 1999, the government initiated a review of 
labour legislation, but only very minor reforms were implemented.  In the same 
year, the Minister of Labour introduced very minor changes to the regulations 
affecting small businesses employing less than ten workers.  Most recently, in 
mid-2005, ANC leaders finally declared their intention of tackling the ‘holy 
cow’ of labour market policy.   A discussion document, tabled at a major ANC 
conference in 2005, proposed excluding small employers from some regulatory 
requirements and from the sectoral wage deals negotiated between large 
employers and unions.  This was opposed strongly by COSATU and the South 
African Communist Party, who secured a conference resolution that left labour 
market reform off the immediate agenda.2  The only major reverse to the labour 
movement has been the government’s sidelining of NEDLAC. 
 
Critics charge that the continued participation of COSATU in an alliance with 
the ANC is bad for workers.  The COSATU leadership is accused of selling out 
union members and buying into ‘neo-liberal corporatism’ in order to secure 
marginal influence on economic and social policy-making (see the essays in 
Bramble and Barchiesi 2003).  But participation in the Alliance has led to 
substantial gains for unionized workers.  Webster and Adler understated the case 
when they wrote that there were moves ‘towards’ a class compromise between 
capital and labour in South Africa.  In important respects, workers achieved a 
class compromise: workers accepted the capitalist economy in return for real 
wage increases, constraints on dismissal, and improved conditions at work.  In 
addition, many workers have benefited from changes outside of the workplace 
since 1994.  Many working people live in better housing, with better services, 
than they did before 1994.  Their children have better opportunities to complete 
high school or even study further.  Many are very aware that their lives are much 
better than they were under apartheid, and much better than their parents’ lives.  
For this, relatively privileged section of the ‘working class’, labour-market 
reforms, deracialization and improved service delivery represent good reasons to 
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support the ANC, and to continue to support COSATU’s alliance with the ANC.  
If COSATU was to leave the Alliance with the ANC, it would not take all (or 
perhaps even most) of its members with it, would probably prompt the 
establishment of a rival, pro-ANC federation, and would risk losing the capacity 
to veto reforms of labour-market policy or privatization. 
 
In post-apartheid South Africa, the power of capital and labour cannot be 
measured in terms of strikes or lock-outs or their consequences.  Nor should 
power simply be measured in terms of trends in wages and profits, although 
these are important indicators.  Power, rather, should be understood primarily in 
terms of the working of the institutions and procedures within or through which 
wages are determined and employment is regulated.  The power of the organized 
working-class in the mid-1990s resulted in the reform of institutions and 
procedures that favoured high wages and favourable conditions of employment 
for union members, i.e. the ‘insiders’ in the formal labour market.  Even when 
the apparent power of the unions and organized working-class diminished in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, the class remained capable of vetoing explicit policy 
shifts.  Capital, in contrast, had to learn to live with a second-best labour policy 
environment in the 1990s and to accept BEE in the 2000s.  Its power lies not in 
any direct veto over such policies, but in its capacity to adapt to the new 
environment by withholding investment. 
 
Having remained within the ANC Alliance, COSATU’s influence rose again in 
the mid-2000s amidst struggles within the ANC over who should succeed Mbeki 
as president.  The organizational power of the left, within both COSATU and 
the SACP means that the left punches above its weight.  Few candidates for the 
succession are going to risk alienating important and organized constituencies.  
Most candidates are likely, instead, to court these constituencies through fresh 
promises. 
 
 
The State 
 
Critics of neo-liberalism portray the post-apartheid state as a neo-liberal state, 
committed to rolling back its own reach and extending markets wherever 
possible.  The energetic embrace of trade liberalization in the early 1990s 
provided some evidence for this, and the GEAR wish-list provided more.  The 
sidelining of NEDLAC suggests that the state should not be seen as a corporatist 
state, and the presence of (black) businessmen and women in the ‘new 
establishment’ certainly indicates that this is not a worker’s state.  But there is 
too much evidence of active state intervention in the economy, and more 
specifically of the subversion of markets, to suggest that the state can be viewed 
as neo-liberal. 
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The government itself denies that it has abandoned interventions in the market.  
Since 2004, it refers to its attempts to build a ‘developmental’ state.  The 
government was at pains to emphasize that growth and development would not 
simply be left to market forces.  The state would play an active and 
interventionist role – as has states in parts of East and South-east Asia.  
Throughout the late 1990s, the Department of Trade and Industry tried to 
develop pro-active industrial policies, and in the 2000s this developmental role 
extended to state investments in infrastructure (Southall 2006).  The rhetoric of a 
‘developmental’ state probably appealed to some ANC leaders because of their 
vanguardist approach to the armed struggle in the 1970s and 1980s, and to 
others who were grappling with the meaning of communism or socialism in a 
post-Soviet world.  But the reality of the South African state was very different 
to the models of the ‘developmental’ states of East and South-east Asia.  The 
post-apartheid state has weak links with existing, ‘white’ capital, quite unlike 
the links that characterized the developmental states of East Asia.  The 
relationship between state and capital has many adversarial features, including 
the imposition on capital of the state’s agenda of racial transformation.  New 
‘black’ capital is too dependent on both the state and established capital for it to 
develop a meaningful economic partnership with the state.  The state might be 
vanguardist, imposing transformation on capital, but it is not yet a 
developmental state, pushing and pulling capital in developmental directions. 
 
‘Development’ was a key component of the ANC’s ‘Reconstruction and 
Development Programme’, which began life as the party’s manifesto in the 1994 
elections.  The other ingredient in the manifesto was ‘reconstruction’ and, 
implicitly, redistribution.  The ANC has consistently trumpeted its concern with 
redistribution as well as growth, although little thought was put into the 
redistributive side of the picture.  Redistribution really meant distribution that 
was more just, i.e. the working poor should be paid more (through minimum 
wage legislation etc), public schools and clinics should be improved, and so on.  
But the state inherited a functional and highly effective set of redistributive 
social welfare programmes that, together, meant that the South African state 
was, inter alia, a welfare state.  Between 1993-94 and the mid-2000s, the share 
of GDP being redistributed to the poor through non-contributory social 
assistance programmes rose from about 2 percent to about 3.6 percent.  Old-age 
pensions remained the largest single programme, but child support grants cost 
about 1 percent of GDP and disability grants – many paid to AIDS-sick people – 
cost almost this.  In total, more than ten million grants were paid monthly, in a 
country with just 45 million people (Seekings 2007b). 
 
Key ANC leaders were for a long time deeply ambivalent about the welfare state 
that they inherited.  The first phase of proposed welfare reforms in the late 
1990s entailed a shift from grants to ‘developmental’ welfare.  These reforms 
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were not effected.  But ANC leaders continued to denounce ‘handouts’ to the 
poor.  The government was said to be spending ‘too much’ on social assistance, 
and any movement towards a ‘welfare state’ should be resisted.  In this, the post-
apartheid state has adopted the discourse of the late-apartheid state.  Poverty 
reduction should focus on employment creation – including, in the short-term, 
public works programmes – rather than welfare programmes.  But the failure to 
deliver job creation or even significant numbers of job ‘opportunities’ on public 
works programmes resulted in the government reluctantly embracing welfare.  
Government ministers now take pride in what Mbeki has called the ‘third pillar’ 
of the government’s strategy.  The first pillar is the promotion of ‘the growth 
and development of the First Economy’; the second is addressing ‘the 
challenges of the Second Economy’ (i.e. unemployment and the informal 
economy).  The third pillar comprises ‘building a social security net to meet the 
objective of poverty alleviation’.  It is important to note the absence of any 
serious mention of land reform.  In South Africa, the safety net for the poor 
comprises cash transfers, not access to land. 
 
The South African state is a modern state in other respects also.  It includes an 
unusually efficient tax office (the South African Revenue Service).  It also 
regulates employment relationships, as we have seen already, through legislation 
such as the Labour Relations Act.  This combination of pro-union employment 
regulation, welfare programmes, and moderate, pro-business developmentalism 
invite comparison with social democratic states of the global North.  Indeed, 
Hirsch argues that ‘the ANC government followed a consistent economic 
philosophy’. 
At the centre is a social democratic approach to social reform – it is 
the state’s job to underwrite the improvement in the quality of life of 
the poor and to reduce inequalities, but with a firmly entrenched fear 
of the risks of personal dependency on the state and of the emergence 
of entitlement attitudes.  The state exists within a market economy that 
depends on private investment, and therefore a successful state creates 
an environment that supports high levels of private investment.  This 
does not require the state simply to step aside for business, but rather 
that it should work with business and labour to develop growth-
oriented strategies. (Hirsch 2005: 3) 
Whilst broadly persuasive, this interpretation requires a number of 
qualifications.  First, the state is in some important respects, distinctly non-
modern.  In the early 2000s, the ANC-led government legislated the transfer of 
powers to unelected chiefs, including over the allocation of land.  It did so 
without regard for regional differences, i.e. as if all chiefs enjoyed equal 
legitimacy.  In some areas, including Xhalanga in the Eastern Cape, chiefs did 
not control the land and did not enjoy either power or legitimacy prior to 
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apartheid; the apartheid state sought to impose chiefs, but this was thwarted by 
popular resistance.  The democratic state’s policies on reviving chieftainship and 
‘retribalisation’, driven by the ANC’s bid for the support of chiefs and 
traditionalists, have compromised democracy (Ntsebeza 2005), and are cleary 
antithetical to a meaningfully social democratic worldview. 
 
Secondly, what does social democracy mean in a developing country context 
like South Africa, especially one in which there is a massive surplus of labour?  
Unemployment drives poverty, and the welfare state provides no direct 
protection against unemployment.  In this context, a social democratic approach 
would surely require either massive efforts in terms of low-wage job creation or 
the extension of the welfare state to cover those who are unable to work because 
there are no jobs for them.  The South African state has not tackled either of 
these challenges (Seekings and Nattrass 2005).  Nor has it tackled the land 
question, abandoning a commitment to pro-poor land reform (peasantisation) in 
favour of fostering a class of black ‘commercial’, i.e. large-scale, farmers 
(Ntsebeza and Hall 2006).  
 
Thirdly, the state is not homogeneous and monolithic.   The Department of 
Labour, headed by a former trade union leader and staffed primarily by former 
unionists, is an active advocate of the interests of trade unions, and cannot be 
viewed as a pro-business institution.  The Department of Education was, during 
the first decade of democracy, largely unwilling to challenge the South African 
Democratic Teachers’ Union (SADTU).  Only in 2005-06 did the minister and 
senior officials begin to confront the challenge of bringing teachers – many of 
whom are incompetent – to account.  The National Treasury is obviously 
concerned with macro-economic stability, but is not nearly as hostile to 
redistributive programmes as left critics imagine, as long as redistribution is 
efficient in terms of reaching the poor and is not hijacked by special interests 
(such as public sector workers).  Whilst the Department of Labour is broadly 
hostile to labour market policy reform, the National Treasury is broadly in 
favour. 
 
 
A Pluralist Analysis of the State and Ruling 
Party 
 
The complexity of the state mirrors, and is in part rooted in, the diverse and 
heterogeneous character of the ANC.  Lodge compares the ANC to the Congress 
Party of India: both parties are, essentially, coalitions, and different factions are 
linked to or influence by groups in the broader society.  Old ‘white’ businesses, 
new ‘black’ businesses and organized labour all exert influence through 
  
 
20
different factions and mechanisms.  Overall, Lodge concluded in 2002, ‘no 
single movement is dominant’ (2002: 31).   
 
The power of different social groups has changed over time, however, and can 
take different forms.  The early 2000s appear to have seen the growing influence 
of black businessmen and women within the ANC, and the decline in trade 
union influence.  BEE has moved to the centre of state policy.  Corruption, 
especially over the award of state contracts in the name of BEE, is pervasive 
(Camerer 2006).  Much of the ANC leadership is preoccupied with sharing in 
the opportunities for rapid financial enrichment through BEE.  It is not 
surprising that critics wonder whether their enthusiasm for sharing in these 
opportunities might have led political elites to enact the policies that create these 
very opportunities.  No other social group has the pervasive influence of the 
aspirant black bourgeoisie.  It might be unclear how important was financial 
self-interest in the original adoption of BEE policies, relative to other objectives 
such as general Africanisation or the stabilization of capitalism in a racially-
charged environment.  But it is clear that the political elite is too entangled in 
capitalism now either to allow too much power to anti-capitalist critics on its left 
or to go too far down the Zimbabwean route of undermining capitalist 
production itself. 
 
Trade unions retain power, but in specific forms.  In terms of policy-making, 
their power lies primarily in inhibiting undesirable changes to the status quo.  
Trade unions have mobilized effectively against labour market policy reform 
and against reforms of the public sector (especially in education – Seekings 
2004).  Their mobilization is, revealingly, within the ANC Alliance rather than 
in the street or workplace.  The competition over who would succeed Thabo 
Mbeki as president of South Africa after the 2009 elections reveals the great 
investment that unions are making in ANC politics. 
 
Some social groups enjoy little power, outside or within the ANC.  The rural and 
urban poor lack organizational muscle, and the electoral system effectively 
denies them the power to hold elected representatives to account.  Life 
expectancy has fallen drastically, because of AIDS and the government’s foot-
dragging response; inequality has worsened; unemployment has risen; and 
poverty worsened in the late 1990s before (probably) declining somewhat in the 
early 2000s.  The poor have not got land, jobs, good health, or good education 
for their children.  They have received more redistribution through welfare 
programmes, and improved (and subsidized) services such as water and 
electricity (especially in urban areas).  Rising expenditure on welfare is the 
major reason why poverty probably declined slightly in the early 2000s.  But 
even this needs to be put into perspective: the ANC has not introduced any 
major new welfare programmes, but rather has introduced minor (but important) 
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reforms to a system of welfare programmes that was substantially in place not 
only prior to democracy, but prior to apartheid.  And the real value of the old-
age pension, the primary pillar of the welfare state, has still not reached its level 
of mid-1993, prior to the transition to democracy (Seekings 2007b). 
 
The emergence of ‘new social movements’ might be seen as the demand by the 
poor and excluded for a place at the table (see Ballard et al. 2006).  Whilst some 
of the most important movements (the trade unions and the Treatment Action 
Campaign) have assiduously maintained their loyalty to the ANC whilst 
criticizing specific policies, others have united in a coalition that is explicitly 
hostile to the ANC government (and has therefore been dubbed by the ANC as 
‘ultra-left’).  Their demands focus on access to urban land, housing and services.  
Recurrent episodes of direct action in townships around the country give the 
impression of breadth and depth to the movement.  Yet, when movement leaders 
have contested local elections, they have almost always performed poorly.  
Their support base seems to be fickle and shallow, and the ANC is likely to be 
able to contain dissent through judicious concessions on access to and the 
affordability of urban land, housing and services.  
 
In the late 1990s, Webster and Adler (1999) suggested that South Africa was 
moving ‘towards’ a class compromise, between capital and labour.  The 
capitalist system remained, and capitalists even secured some neo-liberal 
policies, but with powerful safeguards of workers’ rights and higher wages.  
This formulation neglected the role of the welfare state in redistributing to the 
poor.  A more appropriate formulation seemed to be that of a double class 
compromise, with the poor benefiting from redistribution through the budget, 
and the prospect of job creation.  This might have reflected the electoral power 
of the poor (Nattrass and Seekings 2001).  A closer inspection of some of the 
gains for the poor revealed that they were driven, in part, by the self-interest of 
public sector unions, suggesting that the class compromise was less inclusive 
(Seekings 2004).  Developments in the early 2000s demand further 
modifications to the class compromise story.  Unions, specifically COSATU, 
continue to exert influence within the ANC Alliance.  But the rising social group 
is clearly black business.  Insofar as the South African policy regime has social 
democratic characteristics, these are combined with distinctly reactionary 
concessions to chiefs in rural areas, Africanist elements in terms of both chiefs 
and BEE, and a neglect of the interests of the unemployed.  In struggles between 
established business, new black business, and trade unions, and with chiefs 
demanding benefits too, the poor are likely to continue to be trampled underfoot. 
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